We examine the implication of the assumption in two types of regulatory environments that a new entrant is an equally efficient competitor, on which the price squeeze test is built. Under partial regulation the entrant exits a market because of the higher access rates set by the authority. If we consider this assumption under no regulation, the entrant exits the market by its own inefficiency, and not by the exclusionary strategies of the incumbent. Regardless of the regulatory environments, the incumbent is not responsible for the exit and the assumption is contradictory to the EC decision.
| Published in |
International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (Volume 3, Issue 2-1)
This article belongs to the Special Issue Recent Developments of Economic Theory and Its Applications |
| DOI | 10.11648/j.ijebo.s.2015030201.17 |
| Page(s) | 39-45 |
| Creative Commons |
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited. |
| Copyright |
Copyright © The Author(s), 2015. Published by Science Publishing Group |
Equally Efficient Competitor, Regulatory Environment, Exit of Entrant, 2003 EC Decision, Case of Deutsche Telekom
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APA Style
Yasuo Kawashima, Nobufumi Nishimura. (2015). Equally Efficient Competitor and the Case of Deutsche Telekom: Economic Perspective. International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3(2-1), 39-45. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijebo.s.2015030201.17
ACS Style
Yasuo Kawashima; Nobufumi Nishimura. Equally Efficient Competitor and the Case of Deutsche Telekom: Economic Perspective. Int. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 2015, 3(2-1), 39-45. doi: 10.11648/j.ijebo.s.2015030201.17
AMA Style
Yasuo Kawashima, Nobufumi Nishimura. Equally Efficient Competitor and the Case of Deutsche Telekom: Economic Perspective. Int J Econ Behav Organ. 2015;3(2-1):39-45. doi: 10.11648/j.ijebo.s.2015030201.17
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Download@article{10.11648/j.ijebo.s.2015030201.17,
author = {Yasuo Kawashima and Nobufumi Nishimura},
title = {Equally Efficient Competitor and the Case of Deutsche Telekom: Economic Perspective},
journal = {International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
volume = {3},
number = {2-1},
pages = {39-45},
doi = {10.11648/j.ijebo.s.2015030201.17},
url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijebo.s.2015030201.17},
eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijebo.s.2015030201.17},
abstract = {We examine the implication of the assumption in two types of regulatory environments that a new entrant is an equally efficient competitor, on which the price squeeze test is built. Under partial regulation the entrant exits a market because of the higher access rates set by the authority. If we consider this assumption under no regulation, the entrant exits the market by its own inefficiency, and not by the exclusionary strategies of the incumbent. Regardless of the regulatory environments, the incumbent is not responsible for the exit and the assumption is contradictory to the EC decision.},
year = {2015}
}
TY - JOUR T1 - Equally Efficient Competitor and the Case of Deutsche Telekom: Economic Perspective AU - Yasuo Kawashima AU - Nobufumi Nishimura Y1 - 2015/03/18 PY - 2015 N1 - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijebo.s.2015030201.17 DO - 10.11648/j.ijebo.s.2015030201.17 T2 - International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization JF - International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization JO - International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization SP - 39 EP - 45 PB - Science Publishing Group SN - 2328-7616 UR - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijebo.s.2015030201.17 AB - We examine the implication of the assumption in two types of regulatory environments that a new entrant is an equally efficient competitor, on which the price squeeze test is built. Under partial regulation the entrant exits a market because of the higher access rates set by the authority. If we consider this assumption under no regulation, the entrant exits the market by its own inefficiency, and not by the exclusionary strategies of the incumbent. Regardless of the regulatory environments, the incumbent is not responsible for the exit and the assumption is contradictory to the EC decision. VL - 3 IS - 2-1 ER -
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